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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
11682 
There is and was no conflict on the facts involved 
in this trial. The automobile accident involved three 
cars proceeding north on Hickory Road, Hill Air Force 
Base, a two lane road (T-10). It was daylight. The 
driver of the first vehicle, a Mustang, was on active 
duty with the U.S. Air Force reporting to Hill Air 
Force Base (T-4). He had never been stationed at 
Hill Field (T-4). He was driving north on said road 
when he observed a sign which stated "NO CIVILIAN 
VEHICLE BEYOND THIS POINT" {T-11). Seely 
assumed that the sign referred to him and stopped 
(T-11). His stop was in the lane of traffic {T-12), 
although he could have driven off the side of the road. 
He was stopped for several seconds prior to the time 
of impact (T-15). He had stopped in a normal fashion 
(T-7), not jumping on the brake or panicing (T-7). 
The stop occurred approximately 10 yards past the sign 
previously described. At the time, there were no cars 
coming from the opposite direction (T-15 ). 
The plaintiff, Hines, came up behind Seely. He 
observed Seely's brake lights go on and he came to a 
normal stop (T-67),not a sudden stop (T-67), approx-
imately 10 feet to the rear of the Seely vehicle (T-67). 
After coming to a stop, Hines put his foot on the 
clutch, shifted into second gear, reached for a cigarette 
at which time he was rammed from the rear by the 
vehicle being driven by the defendant Harbertson ('l1-68). 
The impact knocked him into the vehicle owned 
by Seely, causing either $89 or $98 damage to the 
Seely vehicle. The Hines vehicle was knocked 127 feet 
from the point of impact (T-69). One side of the 
frame was knocked forward 7 inches and the left to 
a 45 degree angle. The damage to the vehicle was 
$564 (T-74). 
The defendant, Harbertson, whose impact caused 
the damage complained of, was driving a 1968 Plymouth 
that was damaged in the approximate amount of $600 
(T-17). Ea0h wheel laid down 45 feet of skid marks 
prior to the impact (T-20). 
The road, at the point of impact, was a straight 
road (T-22). When Harbertson was approximately 100 
feet behind the Hines vehicle, he looked to the left 
at a warehouse (T-23). \Vl1en he looked back, he was 50 
2 
feet away and unable to stop (T-23). He stated that 
had he not looked at the warehouse, he would have 
been able to stop in time to avoid the collision (T-25 
and {T-26). The defendant, Harbertson, who was an 
employee of Hill Air Force Base, completely familiar 
with the highway, described the road as follows: 
"There is not a definite curve. There is a Y 
about, Oh, a good block beyond the point of impact, 
where one road goes this way and the other kind of 
takes an off-shoot, not a real curve. There is very 
little turn to the road" {T-28). 
Harbertson never did see the Seely vehicle until 
after the impact (T-24), although he knew he had to 
expect traffic on that road (T-31). 
The plaintiff, Hines, is 48 years old, married, with 
four children (T-65 ). A normally right handed man, 
he lost his r1ght arm in Belgium January 4, 1945 (T-66)". 
He overcame said disability and worked his way to a 
GS - 12 Equipment Specialist Ordinance Supervisor 
{T-66), and taught himself to hunt, fish, and bowl left 
handed with modifications to his equipment (T-67). 
Since that accident, he has been unable to engage in 
any of his normal recreational pursuits (T-76, 77, 78), 
and has pain each day. 
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff, Pearce 
Hines, had some arthritis of the spine (T-38), but his 
back had never bothered him (T-77). Dr. Gardner, 
who had treated the plaintiff for a substantial period 
of time and who had operated on him (T-43), testified 
that Hines had been assymptomatic prior to the acci-
dent. That while Hines had obviously had the con-
3 
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dition, he did not know he had it aud that there was 
nothing in his prior treatnwnt of Pearce Hines to 
indicate that he had ever had any difficulty or baek 
problem prior to the time of the accident Cl1-44 and 
T-45). The doctors examination, immediately prior 
to trial, indicated the objective signs as limitation of 
motion and muscle spasm tenderness ('11 -42), and that 
he has a permanent impairment of his back (T-42 and 
T-43) that will permanently prevent him from engaging 
in most sport activities or heavy physical work and 
which require movement of the body and particularly 
movement of the spine (T-47). Dr. Gardner's test-
imony was uncontradicted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING NO INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY ADVISING THEM OF THEIR 
DUTIES, DEFINING LEGAL TERMINOLOGY, OR 
FURNISHING GUIDE LINES FOR THEIR DELIB-
ERATIONS. 
The defendant Harbertson is appealing to this 
Court because of the alleged failure of the Court to 
give certain cautionary instructions. His exceptions are 
set forth in full as follows: 
"The defendant further excepts to the Court's 
failure to give the jury cautionary instructions 
with relation to their duties as jurors. The 
fact that their verdict should not be based upon 
sympathy, conjecture or speculation. '11hat their 
verdict should be confined solely to the evidence 
produced in Court." (T-120) 
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The law in Utah relative to exceptions was Ill.id 
down in Employers' Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wis-
consin vs Allen Oil Co., 123 U 253, 258 P2d 445 as 
follows: 
"The appellants' objection in the trial court 
to instruction No. 19 was couched in general 
terms, viz 'on the grounds and for the reasons 
that such instruction is not supported by, and is 
contrary to, the law and the evidence. That it 
is misleading, and can only serve to confuse the 
jury.' rrhe objection failed to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, that 'In objecting to the giving of 
an instruction, a party must state distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds of 
his objection.' One of the purposes in requiring 
counsel to make objections to instructions in 
the trial court is to bring to the attention of the 
court all claimed errors in the instructions and 
to give him an opportunity to correct them if he 
deems it proper. The objection should be spec-
ific enough to give the trial court notice of the 
very error in the instruction which is complained 
of on appeal. But an objection that an instruc-
tion is 'not supported by, and is contrary to, the 
law' lacks specificness and does not direct the 
court's attention to anything in particular." 
It will be observed that he did not specifically object 
to the failure to give JIFU Instruction No. 1.1, 1.5, 1.8, 
or 1.13; nor did not request or submit any instructions 
for the Courts approval. 
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Further, error cannot be based upon failure to give 
a particular instruction when no request therefor is 
made, STatc vs Lee Foo Lun, 45 U 531, 147 Pac 488; in 
re Hanson's Will 50 U 207, 167 Pac 256; Salt Lake and 
U. P. Union RR vs. Schram, 56 U53, 189 Pac. 90; Taylor 
vs RR, 61 U 524, 216 Pac 239; State vs M cN a11ghton, 
92 U 99, 58 P2d 5. 
The duty of a court to give cautionary instruction 
is not the same as is the duty to give instructions relative 
to the issues on the case. The giving of cautionary in-
struction is within the sound discretion of a court, 
Wilcox vs. Coons, Missouri, 241 SW2d 907; State vs. 
Black, Oregon, 193, 295, 236 P2d 326; and there is author-
ity to the effect that cautionary instructions should not 
be given if the same is unnecessary, Missouri, Morris vs. 
Dupont deNemours and Company, 351 Mo. 479, 173 
SW2d 39; Iowa, Clark Vs. Hubbell, 249 I 306, 36 NW2d 
905; Wimberley vs. City of Paterson, NJ 183, A2d 691; 
Johnson vs. Nathan, 161 Neb. 399, 73 NW2d 398; Georgia 
Bittler vs. Cane, 100 SE'12d 598. 
The refusal to give a cautionary instruction is in 
error unless it appears that the discretionary power of 
the court to give or refuse to give an instruction has 
been abused, Beyer vs. Martin, 120 Iowa Appeals 50; 
Arnold vs. RR Co., Mo., 154 SW2d 58; see also, Butler 
vs. Cane, Georgia Supra. 
It has been held that it is not improper to instruct a 
jury that they are not to be influenced by sympathy or 
prejudice providing the circumstances warrant, H oitgh vs. 
Miller Idaho 44 NE2d 228 ,· Wedhemer vs. Cincinnati 
' ' 
State Railway Co., Ohio, 42 NE2d 460. However, in Mis-
6 
souri, Johnson vs. St. Louis RR Co., 173 Mo. 307, 73 SW-
2d 173 has held that it is improper to do so when nothing 
has transpired to indicate that the jurors are not aware 
of their duty. In a proper case, the Court should give 
such an instruction when requested so to do, Shanks 
vs. RR Co., 98 Wash. 509, 167 Pac. 1074. 
The defendant Harbertson does not claim that there 
was any evidence upon which the court should have been 
required to give such an instruction. Nor, has he con-
tended that the court abused his discretion. 
His appeal is predicated upon the conception that 
a court has the same obligation to instruct the jury for 
cautionary rules as it does on the principle facts and 
issues. He correctly states further the latter rule as 
stated in 53 AM JUR Trial, Section 510. The rule is 
again stated similarly in 53 AM JUR Trial, Section 512 
as follows: 
"It is a well-stated general principle that 
the instructions given by the trial court should 
be confined to the issues raised by the pleadings 
in the case at bar and the facts developed by 
the evidence in support of those issues or ad-
mitted at the bar. In other words, the particular 
matters to be covered in the instructions depend 
upon the issues joined by the pleading and sup-
ported by the evidence." 
The Utah cases that he cites are in direct support 
of this rule, Sutton vs. Otis Elevator Co., 68 U 85, 249 
Pac. 437; Hanks vs. Christensen, 11 U2d 8, 354 P2d 564, 
and Johnson vs. Cornwall Warehouse, 16 U2d 186, 398 
P2d 24. The cases all can be viewed in light of the 
7 
courts statement jn Hanks vs. Christensen 
"The criticism of the substance of the in-
relates mainly to the charge that 
they do not spell out the correct standard of 
care." 
None of these cases ref er even by inference to a 
duty to give what the defendant Harberston himself 
recognizes to be solely cautionary instructions. 
The court having directed a verdict against the 
defendant Harbertson correctly submitted the issue and 
element of damage to the jury. The defendant Harbert-
son does not contend that the damage instruction so 
given was incorrect so that the only issue for the jury 
to consider was, in fact, instruction upon damages and 
properly so. 
The failure to give cautionary instructions rests 
upon the sound discretion of the trial court. No abuse 





COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING 
AGAINST THE DEFENDAN11 
The plaintiff brought this action against Nile W. 
Harbertson and Gil B. Seely charging that they were 
guilty of joint and concurrent negligence. Both parties 
answered charging contributory negligence. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the plaintiff made 
a motion to find that the plaintiff was guilty of no 
negligence or contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
8 
(TR-111). The Court granted that motion (TR-115). 
Neither party has raised any issue as to the correctness 
of the motion or of the ruling thereon. As this matter 
stands, the plaintiff was not and could not be found 
guilty of negligence or contributory negligence. 
The plaintiff further made a motion to find both 
parties guilty of negligence as a matter of law and 
further to find the issues of liability in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendants and each of them 
as a matter of law (TR-111). 
The defendant Seely made a motion asking the 
Court for a non-suit and to find the defendant not guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law, or in the alternative, 
that if said defendant Seely was guilty of negligence, 
that is was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries 
(TR-112). 
The Court granted the plaintiff's motion finding 
the defendant Harbertson liable as a matter of law 
(TR-115) and at the same time, granted the defendant 
Seely's motion for non-suit. (TR-115 ). 
The defendant Harbertson has taken exception to 
the Courts ruling finding him liable as a matter of law, 
and has raised this issue on appeal. 
The testimony of the defendant Harbertson him-
self is conclusive on this point, and as a consequence, 
is set out in detail as follows: 
"Q. Is there any possibility that maybe you could 
have turned out, and avoided these vehicles? 
"A. I did partiall turn, but not very much. 
"Q. Well, what do you estimate your speed to be 
at the time of impact? When you hit .Mr. Hines? 
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"A. If I had had ten more feet, I'd have been 
stopped. So I think I was probably down to ten miles 
an hour, or less. 
"Q. Didn't it drive his vehicle ahead several 
The impact1 
"A. Well, he rolled. 
"Q. You don't know how many feet he rolled 1 
"A. No, sir, I don't. I don't know how many feet 
he rolled. 
"Q. Do you think, if you had been looking straight 
down the highway, that you would have been able to 
have got that other ten feet to have stopped¥ 
"MR. MIDGLEY: We'll object to that, as calling 
for a conclusion. 
"THE COURT: Oh, I'll sustain the objection to 
the form of the question. You can rephrase it, if you 
like, Mr. Murray. 
"MR. MURRAY: Q. Mr. Harbertson, do you have 
an opinion-You said first of all ten feet more and 
you would have been stopped¥ 
"A y . . es, sir. 
"Q. And would this time you were looking at the 
warehouse, had you been looking straight ahead, do 
you have an opinion as to whether this would have given 
you enough time to make up for that ten feet 1 
"A. I think I would have stopped, if I had real-
ized they were slowing down, quicker. 
"Q. If you had been looking straight ahead¥ 
"A. Right." (TR-24, 25, 26). 
It will be seen that the defendant Harbertson ad-
mitted that had he been looking at the road, he would 
have seen the vehicle and could and would have stopped 
10 
in time to a void the impact. 
Dr. William James Gardner, the only physician to 
testify, gave his opinion that the impact was respon-
sible for the results that the plaintiff Hines has and 
the disability which he has now and will have in the 
future (TR-43). 
There was no conflict in the evidence. There were 
no other witnes8es that in any way cast any doubt upon 
the defendant Harbertson himself, and no evidence upon 
which anyone could reasonably conclude that said de-
fendant Harbertson was not negligent and that such 
negligence was a proximate cause. 
The defendant Harbertson has not contended on 
appeal, nor did he do so during the trial, that the plain-
tiff Hines was in any way negligent, nor does he raise 
the issue of the correctness of the trial courts ruling 
this appeal. It is submitted that he has waived any 
right to contend that the plaintiff Hines was in any 
way negligent. 
It does not avail the defendant Harbertson to 
raise the issue as to the purported negligence of the de-
fendant Seely. 
The rule is well stated in 52 AM JUR Torts, Sec. 
tion 110: 
"A person who joins in committing a tort 
cannot escape liability by showing that another 
person is liable also; that a third person co-
operated in the wrong is no justification for 
the misconduct of the defendant. The general 
rule as to this matter is that joint tort-feasors 
11 
are jointly and severally liable. Hence, a tort 
jointly committed by several may be treated as 
joint or several at the election of the aggrieved 
party." 
Neither is the defendant Harbertson able to claim 
that the rule heretofore stated is applicable because of 
some right of contribution. The rule relative thereto 
is stated further in 18.AJ2d Page 44 as follows: 
"The general doctrine that one of several 
•persons equally situated who has been com-
pelled to bear more than his equitable share of 
a common burden is entitled to contribution 
from the others who have borne less than their 
respective shares has been subjected to a general 
qualification in cases where the common bur-
den is a joint liability of such persons as tort-
f easors or wrongdoers. In the absence of a 
statute in the particular jurisdiction governing 
the right, it has been frequently declared judi-
cially that as among or between joint wrong-
doers or tort-feasors there can be no contribut-
ion, and that one of several persons who become 
liable to another for a wrong cannot enforce 
contribuition from his co-wrongdoers although 
he is compelled to discharge the whole or more 
than his share of such liability." 
The above rules have been adopted by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in Hardman vs. Matthews, 
1 U2d 110 262, P2d 7 48. In the above case, the plain-
tiff sued defendants for injuries arising our of an auto-
mobile collision. The defendant sued to interplead the 
12 
driver and owner of the car in which plaintiff was 
driving. Claiming with that, the driver as a sole cause 
of the injury or at least a contributory cause, and that 
they were entitled to contribution from joint or concur-
ring tort-feasors. The Court, speaking through Justice 
Henroid said, 
"If the negligence of the interpleaded parties 
were the sole proximate cause of the injuries 
as defendants maintain, the latter would have 
a complete defense to the action without the 
joinder. If actively they were jointly or con-
currently negligent with defendants, joinder 
would avail the latter noting since contribution 
cannot be had between joint or concurring tort-
f easors, in a case like this, unless sanctioned by 
statute, there being none such in Utah." 
The defendant Harbertson had no right either to 
cause the defendant Seely to be joined or for contri-
bution therefrom. 
The defendant Harbertson's contentions upon Point 
II are without foundation or merit. 
POINT III 
THE DAMAGES FOUND WERE EXCESSIVE. 
Dr. William James Gardner, Jr. testified at the 
trial as follows: (TR-61) 
"Well, primarily his difficulty (Hines) is 
confined to his back. His low back, and the 
lumbar area. Where he has spasm, limiation of 
motion and tenderness. These are all objective 
findings. Then he has subjective complaints 
of pain. 
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"Well, I presume that it's a combination of 
muscular and ligamentous injuries that occur-
red at the time of the accident, superimposed 
upon a pre-existing condition of osteoarthritis. 
"That he was assymptomatic as regard to 
any pre-existing physical condition prior to the 
time of the accident (TR-43) and that on the basis; 
of the history, the repeated physical examin-
ation that he had performed that the man (Hines) 
has a permanent impairment of his back." 
The Court instructed the jury in part as follows : 
"Where the result of an accident is to bring 
into activity a dormant disease or one to which 
the injured person is predisposed, the person 
so causing such activity is liable for the entire 
damages which ensue as a proximate result of 
the accident." 
The defendant Harbertson made no exception or 
objection to said instruction and it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the above instruction is a correct state-
ment of law. The rule is set forth in 22AM JU R 2d 
Damage Section 123, Page 175 as follows: 
"The general rule is that where the result 
of the accident is to bring into activity a dormant 
or incipient disease, or one to which the injured 
person is predisposed, the defendant is liable for 
the entire damages which ensue, for it cannot be 
said that the development of the disease as a 
result of the injury was not the consequence 
which might naturally or ordinarily follow as 
a result of the mJury, and therefore, the negli-
14 
gent person may be held liable therefor. If a 
latent condition itself does not cause pain, suf-
fering, etc., but that condition plus an injury 
caused such pain, the injury, and not the latent 
condition, is the proximate cause of the pain." 
See also, 111 ayer vs. Merrick, Colorado, 155 Col. 73, 
392 P2d 653; 111 orrison vs. Hanson, Conn., 20 A2d 624; 
Locku.:ood vs. McCaskill, NC, 138 SE2d 541; Meeks vs. 
Yancey, Tenn. 311 SW2d 329; Gowdey vs. U. S., Mich-
igan, 271 Fed. Supp. 733; N ownes vs. Hillside Lounge, 
Inc., 179 Neb. 157, 137 NW2d 361. 
Based upon that evidence, the instructions and the 
further statement of the doctor to the effect that: 
"Hines could at all times in the future ex-
pect that sports activity or heavy physical work 
which require movements of the body, and par-
ticularly of the spine. 
"These movements tend to bring the muscles, 
ligaments and joints into play, and, when these 
joints have disease in them, the muscles about' 
the joints try to splint the spine, so that it doesn't 
move as much, because that causes pain." TR-47 
It is submitted that when one considers that the 
accident occurred on March 27, 1968 and the symptoms 
as found by the doctor were still present on May 1, 
1969 and were permanent; and when one further con-
siders that at the time of the accident that the plaintiff 
was a 47 year old man, it is repectfully submitted that 
the jury verdict of $9,000 was modest, and that the re-
mittur of $1,000 ordered by the court was indeed unneces-
sary and incorrect. 
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